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In The Sciences of the Artificial Herbert A. Simon reflects 
that “Engineering, medicine, business, architecture, and 
painting are concerned not with the necessary but with the 
contingent – not with how things are but with how they 
might be – in short, with design.”i The reflection serves as 
an introduction to Simon’s attempt at developing a design 
theory: A theory about the conception of that which differs 
from what we already know. A theory in a challenged dialog 
with the contingent.  
 
Simon is aware that traditionally, design theory has been 
orientated towards the establishment of an understanding 
of the canonized and typical, and that the theory as such 
should serve as a guideline for what was to be created. 
Traditionally, the theory has been a reflected list of an-
swers. By way of example, consider how the Neo-Platonic 
architecture treaties of the Renaissance sought to establish 
abstract and ideal rules and frameworks to secure any 
future works. Through repetition of the regular, the work 
becomes an example of a presumed eternal and essentially 
true idea. Or consider the ambitions of the modernist town 
planning, as they were expressed in the resolutions of 
CIAM as well as in concrete town planning proposals, in 
which the specific purpose was to transform the town’s 
quantitative environment into qualitative by means of ‘ab-
straction and repetition’. The architects of modernism and 
the Renaissance shared a confidence in the possibilities of 
the abstraction to establish a template for the individual 
example. Consequently, both lines of thinking demonstrate 
confidence that by means of mathematics and the Euclidian 
geometry, an essential world structure is found which may 
justify the qualitative validity of abstract rules. And that is 
precisely why the repetition of the structures and types of 
the abstraction becomes a design-theoretical imperative. 
Whilst the Renaissance treaties gave the impression of 
being carried by an insight into the world’s eternal – divine – 
structure, the modernists were orientated towards the tech-
nological or the natural. However, to some extent the rules 
were the same, as Colin Rowe pointed out in his famous 
article, ‘The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa’. Rowe compares 
– in continuation of Rudolf Wittkower’s Renaissance studies 
– Palladio’s and Le Corbusier’s basic plans for villas and 
demonstrates remarkable similarities between the syntactic-
geometric organizational principles of the plans. To a cer-
tain degree, modernism naturalizes the divinely founded 
rules of the Renaissance. And because of this, it gives rise 
to expectations that, as is the case with the Renaissance 
treatises, architectural theory should develop ideas and 
rules that are valid for the concrete assignment, notwith-
standing that they – the rules – are developed in abstract 
independence of any contingent situation. 
 
Those are the types of expectations to the theory that 
Simon argues against when insisting that the work is con-
tingent. He claims that the individual work differs unpre-
dictably from the rules and typologies that existed prior to 
the work. However, Simon’s skepticism towards normative 
design theories does not imply that he finds theoretical work 
irrelevant for the creation of the contingent. On the contrary, 
Simon’s ambition is to establish a mutual experimental 
relation between theory and practice.  
 
This ambition to establish a science about the artificial, 
based on the experimental in both theory and practice, 
appears somewhat congenial with Stan Allen’s critical 
reflections on the relation between theory and practice in 
the essay collection Practice – architecture, technique, and 
representation. Allen does not argue that criticism of tradi-
tional theory should result in notions that theory and prac-
tice should be separated. On the contrary, it is Allen’s opin-
ion that the missing dialog between theory and practice is 
part of the problem. On one hand, this implies that the 
theory could be perceived as a set of ideal codes and con-
ventions determining the significance and purpose of archi-
tecture independent of practice. On the other hand it im-
plies, that practice is maintained in traditional, naturalized 
rules and procedures, which might have been relativized 
and changed by the challenged theory. In the essay collec-
tion’s introductory chapter, Allen comments that,  
 
“Today’s conventional view (prevalent, for example, in 
schools of architecture) understands theory as an abstrac-
tion: a set of ideas and concepts independent of any par-
ticular material instance. Practice, in turn is understood as 
the object of theory. In this view, theory tends to envelope 
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and protect practice, while practice excuses theory from the 
obligation to engage reality. Design is reduced to the im-
plementation of rules set down elsewhere. Ironically, the 
separation that results is not dissimilar from the very struc-
ture of conventional practice supposedly challenged by 
theory. Conventional practice renounces theory, but in so 
doing, it simply reiterates unstated theoretical assumptions. 
It works according to a series of enabling codes, which 
have been defined without reference to individual practice.”ii 
 
Hydra 
We share Simon’s ambition, and we are aware that in 
architecture – with its concrete, practical assignments and 
in its related, theoretical discussions – we must confront the 
issues to which Allen calls attention. This understanding 
relativizes the objective, geometrical space which in the 
Renaissance and modernism has sustained the theory’s 
notions of a universal, repeatable structure or typology. This 
space must be considered specifically against the subjec-
tive, perceived, and situated, which concerns practice and – 
potentially – contingence.  
 
In continuation of these considerations, it is our thesis that 
the work always – potentially – contains more than the 
theory is able to retain and determine through abstraction.  
 
We believe that the work contains both aspects that can be 
objectified, e.g. geometrical-proportional aspects, and 
perceived and situated aspects. It is therefore not sufficient 
to replace the objectified, geometrical space with Heideg-
ger’s or Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological critique of the 
objective, where the perceived or perceiving and the situ-
ated are given precedence over any abstract and gener-
alizable resolution. The work as such is a structure, a 
statement that contains both the objective and the subjec-
tive, and rather than joining practice and theory through 
phenomenology’s Cézanne-inspired critique of the Renais-
sance and modernism’s objective space, it is our view that 
architecture, understood as a field with many perspectives, 
many places, demands an epistemological reflection.  
 
Such an epistemological reflection is one of several starting 
points for a series of studies carried out on the Greek island 
of Hydra throughout 2004 and 2005 (one final visit is 
planned for 2006).iii The focus of this work is not an objec-
tive mapping. The study is not concerned with the classic 
architectural surveying, nor is it aimed at creating conven-
tional architectural projects. It takes the form of an architec-
tural and artistic development work, establishing a discus-
sion of the architectural contingent through deliberations 
concerning the interchange between the mapped and the 
perceived, through reflections about architectural drawing 
conventions and ways of drawing, and through a procedural 
exchange between the contextualized and the independent 
drawing.  
 
Hydra is characterized by a dramatic topography that cre-
ates a landscape of dynamic forces, which clearly deter-
mines the nature, building typologies, infrastructure etc. of 
the island. The mapping of this landscape of dynamic 
forces forms the basis for the architectural work. The initial 
question for this work could then be as follows: How is it 
possible to develop an architectural statement in dialog with 
the energies and dynamics which characterize precisely 
this complex landscape?  
 
 
Drawing and representation 
This question takes as it starting point reflections about the 
architectural creation process as a relation between me-
dium and statement. You may claim that architecture, as 
opposed to most other art forms, works with a distance 
between artist and statement. The extent and the complex-
ity of the architectural statement make it necessary to inter-
ject a medium – typically the drawing – as a contributory 
intermediate link. This means, that the drawing is neither 
merely an objective tool nor a passive medium which simply 
registers and formalizes the architect’s ideas so that they 
can be realized as buildings. 
 
The English architect and historian Robin Evans discusses 
this relation in his The Projective Cast. Architecture and Its 
Three Geometries. Evans shows that geometry is inevitable 
in the creation and appropriation of architecture, but it is 
worth noticing that he does not link this inevitability to uni-
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versal organizing charts. Geometry emerges and is devel-
oped in the interchange between thinking and drawing, 
between drawing and building, between perception and 
thinking:  
 
“The First place anyone looks to find the geometry in archi-
tecture is in the shape of buildings, then perhaps in the 
shape of the drawings of the buildings. These are the loca-
tions where geometry has been active in the space be-
tween and the space at either end. What connects thinking 
to imagination, imagination to drawing, drawing to building, 
and building to our eyes is projection in one guise or an-
other, or processes that we have chosen to model on pro-
jection. All are zones of instability. I would now claim that 
the engaging questions of architecture’s relation to geome-
try occur in these zones.”iv 
 
The challenge of the scales 
We can expand on Evans’ view by referring to Philip Bou-
don. Boudon stresses the scales’ significance in Architec-
turology. To Boudon, it is absolutely decisive that notions 
that the Renaissance and modernism should be founded in 
an objective space are based on the architectural theories’ 
scale oversight: The identification of space with geometry 
and – in continuation of that – of architecture with geometry 
is based on the oversight that architecture as opposed to 
geometry comprehends size, measurements, and as such 
gives measurements to our world, and that architecture in 
any volume can have many perceived spaces. However, 
Philip Boudon points out that the theory, which is in dialog 
with the conception of architecture, can neither be based on 
notions of the objective space nor on phenomenology’s 
contrary weighting of the subjective, the perceived. As the 
creative practice, the theory, too, must know how to work 
with both the objective and the subjective in an open com-
plexity. Boudon:  
 
“If Henri Poincaré in relation to our everyday space indi-
cates that the space of experience is not that of geometry 
[Euclidian] and decides to find a suitable geometry [topol-
ogy], the same issue can be raised in relation to the archi-
tectural space: Which ‘geometry’ will be suitable to make 
this space intelligible? (...) It would then be possible to pass 
from Euclidian geometry to topology thinking that the latter 
solves the problems raised in relation to the former. (...) But 
can any geometry – no matter which – explain the issue of 
scale, when we know that geometry is born by negating the 
scale? (...) The task is then to invent a spatial concept 
which explains the architectural space in accordance with 
the understanding displayed and which is concerned with 
measurements, sizes, scales.  
 
(...) If, as indicated by Poincaré, space is created in relation 
to experiences and therefore not, as Kant claimed, a priori, 
it must be constructed, which it will be in accordance with 
various geometries, and then you might understand by way 
of analogy, that the architectural space is also created on 
the basis of certain experiences, but also that these experi-
ences differ from experiences gained by anyone, and that 
rather than perceptual experiences they are conceptual 
experiences.v  
 
Instead of examining perceptual experiences related to the 
everyday space, Architecturology seeks to examine experi-
ences of conception, which may have conception as one of 
its scales. To speak about scales instead of proportion as 
the horizon of design theory is in itself an indication that the 
Euclidian space as a framework for architectural treaties 
from Vitruvius via Alberti to Perrault is a specific, now prob-
lematized framework, even though the framework is not 
replaced by another, e.g. a topological one. The real ques-
tion is then which scales the project can implement – a 
question which the theory may pose but which it can only 
answer on the basis of the concrete, contingent work, i.e. 
with the implementation. It is on the basis of a dialog with 
the creative act, and thus with the media that form part of 
the conception of architecture, that we establish our con-




Along with Boudon and Evans we would claim that architec-
ture is not developed in one conception or through one 
geometry. It is made up of a complex field that contains 
many different aspects. The drawing represents a crossfield 
which makes it possible to channel and coordinate many of 
these different aspects. Geometry is significant because it 
supports and formalizes the architectural drawings’ diversi-
fied interchanges. Supported by geometry the drawing 
becomes a reflection space in which architecture can be 
thought and developed.  
 
The potential of the architectural drawing thus does not 
consist in its incorporation into a overlapping geometry or 
an overlapping space, nor in the idea that it is possible to 
eliminate the distance between the perceiving architect and 
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the architectural statement. The potential arises from the 
possibility of making use of the fissures and free spaces 
created in the drawing’s crossfield between idea, perception 
and formalizing. For that same reason the sectional drawing 
and the relatively high level of abstraction of the plan are 
not a problem either, but rather an opportunity to pinpoint 
and develop architectural questions and issues. 
 
The Hydra project seeks to develop an understanding of 
space which is not related to the ability to think oneself into 
the space and perceive it in perspective considering sizes, 
materials, and light effects. The project rather seeks the 
architectural space created in the tension field between 
context, idea, and drawing, in which it is possible to develop 
an independent dialog by shifting information between 
different drawing forms gradually unfolding a space.  
 
This also explains why the drawings of the Hydra project do 
not unfold architectural spaces in conventional terms. There 
is no specific relation between interior spaces which are 
defined by exterior forms. There is no architectural object 
inserted into or merged with a specific context. Neverthe-
less, the Hydra project is developing specific architectural 
reflections and specific architectural drawing methods in a 
critical dialog with a series of the traditional drawing con-
ventions of architecture. It makes use of the plan drawing’s 
distribution and coordination of diversified domains and 
units, as well as of the vertical course and implied spatial 
depths of the section. It develops a terminology which 
speaks of ‘places’, ‘concentrations’, and ‘components’, and 
it relates these to different states such as the ‘temporary’, 
‘the stationary’, and ‘the mobile’.  
 
However, these conventions and terms are not rigidly and 
unambiguously defined. There is no projective geometry 
which coordinates the formal relations of sectional and plan 
drawings. Instead, their characteristics and relations are 
continuously reconsidered and rearticulated. Architectural 
conventions are – deliberately – made labile. They form a 
provisional basis for the architectural reflection. In this way, 
the Hydra project seeks to establish a fragile dialog be-
tween the perceived and the registered, between Hydra’s 
dynamic landscape and the drawing’s independent logic. Its 
aim is to sustain and develop this dialog in order to develop 
and qualify the architectural statement. 
 
Digital imperfection 
The Hydra project’s applied reflections about the relation 
between statement, geometry, and media are also con-
nected with a special use of digital tools and the distinct 
knowledge related to these. 
 
Stan Allen has pleaded the case of a less technology fix-
ated rethinking of the digital media’s architectural potentials. 
He indicates that the development of digital tools in the late 
‘80s and early ‘90s lead to a technological fetishism based 
on advanced animation software and a formal fascination of 
the complex, plastic form world which these tools made 
possible. For architects such as Greg Lynn and Bernard 
Cache, these digital tools provoke the idea that it will be-
come possible to determine the architectural statement 
through algorithms that are able to convert complex contex-
tual relations and influences into architectural form. In a 
certain sense, these architects are once again trying to 
found architecture on a normative geometric basis. They 
are simply replacing the Euclidian geometry of the Renais-
sance and modernism with a topological one.  
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Allen claims that as the computer becomes common prop-
erty, it will no longer be possible to maintain the same 
fetishist relation to the digital tools. Instead it will become 
possible to develop an innovative, low-tech approach to the 
medium. “Operating more like a fitness landscape, success-
ful buildings and cities offer degrees of appropriateness and 
levels of fit; an architecture open to the contingencies of 
contemporary life and capable of sponsoring a variety of 
activities over time. To design for this uncertainty requires 
an intelligent deployment of technology, but it also implies a 
skepticism about singular, totalizing, technological solu-
tions. 
 
This is only one possible direction that might emerge out of 
a less complex relationship to digital technology in architec-
ture – a reasonable, inventive, and expedient use of avail-
able digital technologies within the logics of our own disci-
pline… The computer is an abstract machine, and as it 
moves beyond the logics of visualization, new potentials 
open up.”vi  
 
The Hydra project implicitly seeks to rethink the questions 
and challenges the computer represents to the architectural 
drawing in order to develop a distinctive drawing logic 
related to the computer. A logic in which the significance of 
the drawing is not based on a formalized spatial representa-
tion of data but rather on the specific possibilities that 
emerge from the computer’s data handling and interface. 
This approach is based on the idea that it is possible to 
consider this potential backwards through a reflection on 
the differences between drawing by means of conventional 
drawing tools and through the computer interface.  
 
The traditional architectural drawing is developed in an 
interchange between sketching and constructing. The 
sketch has an immediate physical relation and thus a rela-
tion of scale. It is a gesture that emerges in a physical 
coordination of visual and perceptory impressions, motor 
function, and drawing tool. The sketch is immediate; it can 
rapidly search and test various courses, relations, or ex-
changes. The constructed drawing formalizes the potential 
of the sketch by means of drawing tools, and gradually 
submits it to a geometric construction. However, there is no 
unambiguous and linear relation between the two drawing 
forms. The sketch is not formalized by the drawing of ‘cor-
rect’ geometrized lines through its implied form universe. 
The formalized drawing rather reconstructs the potentials of 
the sketch in a new independent statement. This statement 
is opened up again by new sketches which subvert and 
reconfigure the formalized drawing’s construction in a con-
stant interchange between that which builds and that which 
opens up.  
 
The computer interface changes the relation between body 
and drawing. The architectural drawing creates a relation 
between drawing and building based on scale, but at the 
same time it also creates a relation between the architect’s 
body and the drawing. Sizes, relations, and connections are 
distended by the drawing’s physical size and delimitation. 
At one and the same time there is a visual and a physical 
decoding of the drawing which is not found in the digital 
drawing, which can be steplessly scaled within the fixed 
delimitation of the computer screen. This physical distance 
is also connected to the execution of the drawing. The 
drawing’s relation between body, pencil, and line is compli-
cated by the computer interface in which the drawing is 
created in interchanges from hand to mouse to screen to 
printer.  
 
The dissociated physical relation is at the crux of the chal-
lenges to the digital drawing. It causes a displacement from 
the gesture of the sketch to the formalized drawing’s con-
struction. This also affects the producing interchange be-
tween that which builds and that which opens up. In the 
computer drawing, the unambiguous and the geometric 
have a tendency to become dominant which results in faulty 
incompleteness rather than constructive imperfection. The 
challenge to the digital medium consists in overcoming the 
unambiguity and rethinking the conventional drawing’s 
dynamic changing between that which is searching and 
opening, and that which is formalizing and clarifying.  
 
The Hydra project seeks to develop a parallel to the speed 
and lightness of the sketch in the computer’s ability to 
absorb and manipulate different types of information. In the 
computer, all information is leveled into binary chains of 
numbers that can be processed mathematically. This level-
ing of information causes a particular flatness; however, this 
flatness is a potential rather than a problem. The computer 
makes it possible to remain on the surface. It makes it 
possible to copy, move, and manipulate the different ele-
ments and information of the drawing with a certain superfi-
cial speed. It blends information, formalizes it, and makes it 
mutually interchangeable. The stratified design of the com-
puter drawing makes it possible to change between differ-
ent types of information – the contextual and the formal, for 
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instance. In this rapid, fluid exchange of information, and 
through the reproducibility and manipulability of the digital 
statement (in which the ability to remove information by 
means of the delete function may be the most significant of 
all), the Hydra project seeks to develop a new productively 
opening approach to the digital drawing material. A produc-
tive approach in which the opening indefiniteness of the 
sketch is replaced by the manipulated morphologically 
varied configurations of the same statement. An indefinite-
ness which continuously assimilates and segregates differ-
ing information changing between the contextualized and 
the independent. In this way, it is possible to create an 
architectural drawing in which the conventional architectural 
drawing’s physical measuring is replaced by a consciously 
casual approach to the computer’s forced precision. 
 
Ceci n’est pas une pipe 
Modern typology studies, as we know them from e.g. Aldo 
Rossi, were based on the understanding that the drawing 
material is anchored in an objective structure, and that the 
individual drawing is comparable to a statement, contingent 
on the structure’s possibilities. Rossi was inspired by struc-
turalist linguistics. The deconstruction and Jacques Derrida 
made us aware that any talk of – and with – an objective 
structure presupposed the delimitation of the objective and 
thus the reflection about what it means to pinpoint an objec-
tivity altogether. Derrida showed that phenomenology in 
particular insistently has raised this issue. As indicated, 
phenomenology found its resources by showing that the 
ideas about objectivity, which do not take into account the 
conditions of objectivity, ignore the fact that the objective is 
objective to a reflecting subject. Phenomenology places any 
idea that cannot be motivated by the subjective reflection in 
parenthesis, and insists on founding knowledge all over 
again in and with this subjective reflection. Phenomenology 
was examining, among other things, whether it might be 
possible to establish objectivity but this time with an em-
phasized understanding of the knowledge-stipulating and 
intentional subject. Objectivity founded in an understanding 
of intentionality. In the article ‘“Genèse et structure” et la 
phénoménologie’, Derrida wrote that, “Even the most naïve 
implementation of the idea of conception, and in particular 
the idea about a structure, presupposes at least a strict 
delimitation between natural areas and the domains of 
objectivity. But this prior delimitation, this elucidation of any 
regional structure, can solely be raised by a phenomenol-
ogical critique. This means, that the latter rightfully always 
comes first. ”vii  
 
It is a well-known fact that it was not Derrida’s ambition in 
this way to replace structuralism with phenomenology. On 
the contrary, Derrida would stress that phenomenology did 
not succeed in sustaining objectivity either: By virtue of 
phenomenology’s insisting on the reflection about the prem-
ises of objectivity, but in contrary to the declared intention of 
phenomenology to establish objectivity in and with the 
subjective and intentional, Derrida claims that it becomes 
possible to unfold whatever possibilities there are in the 
linguistic – structuralist – understanding that origin is not an 
identity, but a game of differences. The individual statement 
– the individual drawing – is conditioned by a structure of 
differences, but as the structure is only known through the 
statement and is not objectifiable an sich, the statement 
(the sketch, the formalized drawing) should rather be exam-
ined for its potential dialog with the contingent than be 
anchored in (and with the idea of) the regular. On this basis, 
structure, which can only insufficiently be objectified, is then 
understood as a field of virtual possibilities, which we know 
solely through dialog with representations, indirectly. As 
previously mentioned, through the Hydra project we seek to 
understand this situation as an imperfection that is chal-
lenging – and helpful – for the development of the mutually 
experimental dialog between practice and theory.  The 
project has no firm foundation or predefined telos, but in 
between these – and by challenging the presumed and 
conventional with the contingent and yet unknown telos – 
practice and theory work in and with the development of a 
structure, a work which will be more than and different to 
something which could be contained by any given point of 
view. As such we are inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s Foucault 
reading, and in particular his demonstration that phenome-
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nology’s necessary confrontation with any unreflected 
objectivity was merely a passage to working practically and 
theoretically – visually and in speech – with a structure that 
is only established and recognized through this work. 
Deleuze: “Foucault [breaks] with phenomenology in the 
‘vulgar’ sense of the term: with intentionality. (...)  
 
If phenomenology ‘places things in parenthesis’ as it claims 
to do, this ought to push it beyond words and phrases 
towards statements, and beyond things and states of things 
towards visibilities. But statements are not directed towards 
anything, since they are not related to a thing any more 
than they express a subject but refer only to a language, a 
language-being, that gives them unique subjects and ob-
jects that satisfy particular conditions as immanent vari-
ables. And visibilities are not deployed in a savage world 
already opened up to a primitive (pre-predicative) con-
sciousness, but refer only to light, a light-being, which gives 
them forms, proportions, and perspectives that are imma-
nent in the proper sense, that is, free of any intentional 
gaze. (...) This is Foucault’s major achievement. The con-
version of phenomenology into epistemology. For seeing 
and speaking means knowing [savoir], but we do not see 
what we speak about, nor do we speak about what we see; 
and when we see a pipe, we shall always say (in one way 
or another): “this is not a pipe,” as though intentionality 
denied itself, and collapses into itself.”viii 
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